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Distinguished Speakers at Seidtnall 

Robert Lund, Senior Vice President of 
Marketing at General Motors, spoke to 
students, faculty, and staff Thursday, 
November 15. His topic was "The Leadership 
Role of the United States in Automotive 
Marketing." He also met over lunch that day 
with fifteen Seidman School Affiliates to 
discuss domestic automotive production and 
the Michigan economy. 
Dr. Steven Skancke, former Staff Director 
of the White House Conference on Produc­
tivity and Deputy Counselor to the Secretary 
of the Treasury, spoke to students, faculty, 
and staff Wednesday, December 5. His topic 
was "Profits and Productivity: Recipes for 
Success." He met with Seidman faculty at a 
luncheon to explore a number of productiv­
ity issues. Dr. Skancke is Vice President of G. 
Wilham Miller and Company. 
Dr. James Buchanan, Director of the 
Center for the Study of Public Choice at 
George Mason University, was in Grand 
Rapids and on campus on Thursday, April 
18. He spoke to west Michigan area econo­
mists at a breakfast meeting, to the Seidman 
School Affiliates at lunch, and to the Grand 
Valley students, faculty, and staff in the after­
noon. His topic at the luncheon meeting was 
"Federal Deficits and the Ethics of Default," 
and his speech on campus was entitled "Public 
Choice Perspectives and the Ethics of De­
fault." Dr. Buchanan's many publications 
include The Economics of Politics, The 
Calculus of Consent, and Fairness, Hope, 
and Justice. 
L. William Seidman, Dean of the School 
of Business at Arizona State University, spoke 
to students, faculty, and staff Thursday, April 
25. His topic was "Productivity and Quality 
in the United States." Mr. Seidman served as 
Economic Policy Coordinator for President 
Gerald R. Ford from 1973 to 1976 and as 
Executive Vice President for Phelps Dodge 
Corporation from 1976 to 1981. 
L. William Seidman 
Barter Clubs and Exchanges: A New Source 

of Inefficiency and Risk 
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These possibilities mean that additional 
costs might have to be incurred to reduce de­
fault risk. Potential members may have to in­
vestigate the exchange and its operators and 
their track records and credit standing. Thus, 
as transactions costs are lowered by reducing 
the double coincidence of wants, other costs 
and risks are higher. But, whatever the mix 
of costs incurred and risks taken, their total 
is higher with barter than with the use of con­
ventional money. 
It should be noted that the units or points 
produced by barter groups are an attempt to 
create another kind of money-an inferior 
one at that. The use of this "money" is limited 
to the members of the barter group, of course. 
It has no acceptability outside the group. 
In effect, barter organizations are an in­
between case, between straight barter, on the 
one hand, and the use of money, on the 
other. They issue a form of money but a 
limited one. 
Inefficiency in Supply
And Demand 
Another source of inefficiency with barter­
ing is that the prices at which trades take place 
are not necessarily equal to the "equilibrium" 
price. This occurs because of the limited 
market for bartered goods and services, 
whether that stems from the double coin­
cidence of wants or the limited number of 
trading partners in barter organizations. 
At this point, you will realize that even 
though goods and services may be bartered, 
they are traded at "prices." The price of a 
good or service in a trade is how much of 
something else is given up for it. A price is 
an "exchange ratio." For example, if three 
chickens are traded for one pig, the exchange 
ratio (the price) of pigs in terms of chickens 
is three, and the price of chicken in terms of 
pigs is one-third. 
The equilibrium price (Pe) at any particular 
time is the price. that balances the supply of 
the goods or services being traded with their 
demand. Consider widgets as the good be­
ing traded in a competitive market. Pe is the 
equilibrium price of widgets. At Pe , the 
number of Widgets demanders want is equal 
to the amount of widgets offered for sale. At 
Pe , there are no Widgets left over and there 
are no unsatisfied demanders who are will­
ing to pay Pe . Pe could be thought of as the 
"true" price of widgets. The higher the pro­
portion of transactions that take place at Pe, 
the more perfect the market. However, the 
more transactions that take place away from 
Pe , the more imperfect the market. 
In barter, the source of this market imper­
fection and inefficiency is the fact that markets 
for bartered goods are much smaller than 
those for the identical goods bought and sold•in regular markets with money Consider a 
combined market for widgets in which most 
are sold and a few are bartered. In a perfect 
market with efficient prices, the price of 
widgets throughout this combined market 
should be the same for identical widgets, 
regardless of whether the Widgets are traded 
for money or for other goods and services. 
However, because there are fewer trans­
actions in the sub market for bartered Widgets 
and fewer possible trading partners, the prices 
of bartered Widgets can be very different from 
those of widgets bought and sold for money. 
A person offering Widgets in the barter sub· 
market might get a lower exchange ratio 
(lower price) than would be the case in the 
monetary market. Similarly, someone 
needing Widgets might pay a higher price than 
in the regular market. In fact, it has been 
reported that some business suppliers of 
goods and services have vastly different prices 
for their products, one price for the regular 
market and another (much higher) for the 
barter market. 
There is no guarantee that the goods and 
services that people want will be supplied 
through the barter organization . Tremendous 
imbalances can occur between supply and .­
mand within the barter submarket, and th 
can allow transaction prices there to be co 
siderably different from the true prices. 
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